British Mistakes During the Revolutionary War Essay

While there are numerous contributing factors to the Statess success in achieving independency, the most particular factor nookie be attributed to the series of British mistakes throughout the departure. Prior to the onset of the rotatory fight, the British government faced serious ch on the wholeenges, both politically and fiscally. The result of the French and Indian War coupled with the fighting in Europe, India and the westernmost Indies, left Britain with considerable debt and with few to little allies. The British government saw America as a way to generate revenue in order to assist in its recovery efforts. The fiscal stress in a post-war economy as well as various inborn struggles with foreign policy, bureaucratic dish upes and growing concern amongst its citizens regarding the war set the pointedness which ultimately ended in America defeating what was the most powerful armed postures in the world. The following paragraphs address specific reasons as to why the British failed to achieve and sustain a strategic advantage during the Ameri plunder regeneration. governance OrganizationFrom the onset of the war, the British failed to provide a cohesive and corporate strategic vision for the dispute with America. The organizational structure and political remains was not particularly efficient in decision making or policy establishment. Decision making was lengthy and critical information and strategic decisions were done independently and often in a dispersed manner. This process considerably added to the frustrations held by the American colonialists. In growth, the British military never had one sole leader to provide and oversee a exit strategic direction of the war effort (Professor Carpenter, NWC lecture).There were often nature clashes amid military controlers, heads of state and other influential roles not to keep an eye on the widespread corruption throughout all government entities which further mixed the situation. As a re sult of the French and Indian War, the British armament had also reduced the number of regiments. Both Naval and Army budgets were slashed resulting in less than half the armaments than at the height of the previous war. The demands of maintaining a home guard as well as other critical areas such as Ireland and Gibraltar stretched threads and provided additional challenges (Professor Carpenter, NWC lecture).In addition, recruiting was also a problem, particularly for British regiments stationed in America. Throughout the war the government experienced cracking difficulty in obtaining sufficient men for the ranks. Again and again it was instal impossible to complete the augmentation voted by parliament (Recruiting of Army, Chapter 3). These internal conflicts and issues led to brusk command and control and ineffective strategic leadership which lacked coherence and unity. misfortune to Understand the True Nature of WarIn order to adequately assess the British perspective of t he American colonists, we must first look the varying aspects of the environment. The British government struggled on how to sufficiently deal with the ascent in America. King George III, a great believer in preserving the British imperial interests, believed a British operation of brute force would force allegiance and submission. Although he himself didnt have the authority, he played an brisk role in persuading Parliament into winning action by pass various key American cities. The British assumed this visual aspect of force would demolish motivation and compel the Americans to cooperate. This approach be to be flawed. The British didnt understand that the American complaints nitty-grittyed on theories of constitution, economic independence and religious concepts.Supply Chain ManagementIn the case of the American Revolution, supply chain management will be approached from two some(prenominal)(predicate) perspectives, the provisioning of troops as well as the overall co mmunication dodging with regard to logistics and apparent movementment of resources. Both play a critical and every bit important role in any campaign and during the American Revolution both proven to be a detriment to the British forces. From archean on the British were confronted with serious challenges with providing provisions for troops operating in America. During the war, British provisioning scheme relied heavily on sustainment assume to have it away from the homeland. The 3000-mile trip proved to a tactical hindrance in alimentation the troops as well as resupplying with ammunition, blankets, shoes and armament. Often taking several(prenominal) months to arrive, the supplies arrived spoiled and unusable. Further amplifying the issue, the U.S. Continental Congress authorized effectual piracy which attributed to the seizing of over 300 British ships during the war.In addition to the resupply of troops, insufficient and ineffective use of transportation resources dimini shed British effectiveness on the battlefield. Due to poor planning and negligent communication between commanders, the various transport agencies utilized to resupply the British army struggled with prioritizing missions and did not in effect communicate with each other. In addition, independent decisions were made to keep units on-station to move troops vice sending rearward to resupply. Misaligned campaign plans and the lack of communication and collaboration among commanders resulted in a confused supply chain and complications for command and control. This ultimately slowed logistics support to troops and reduced British sustainment on the battlefield.Failure to Maximize sea PowerMahan advocates a successful navy must adopt and utilize an offensive dodge. From the onset of the American Revolution, the British did well in meeting this requirement and until the French entered the war, the British displayed an arouse naval superiority over the Americans, largely due to the fa ct that the American colonists did not have any naval forces. In the end, however, the British failed in sustain naval superiority when France and Spain entered the war. Their inability can be attributed to several critical areas failure to adequately reinvest in the replenishment of its fleet, failure to strike and equip its service members, and failure to effectively leverage naval forces in key campaigns Saratoga and Yorktown in particular. The 3000 mile supply chain, extra resources, piracy and lack of synergy among leadership and shipping agencies did not brook for the British fleet to organize themselves for sustainment purposes nor establish, enforce and maintain sea power.Mahan maintains the two major strategies for a strong sea power is a powerful Navy and a wide reaching commerce (Mahan, Sea Power, p. 539). In order to adequately defeat the enemy, Britain needed to capitalize on the lack of naval power prior to Frances entrance into the war. By not taking appropriate s teps to keep France out the war, the British effectively positioned themselves for failure. Mahan completely disagreed with how the British executed naval warfare by and by the French and Spanish entered the war. He believed that the British should have taken a more active approach in blockading European ports in order to bring the naval fight back to European soil.Mahan declared the whole fortune of the war should at the first have been staked on a concentration of the English fleet between Brest and Cadiz. (Mahan, Sea Power, 415). It was his legal opinion that this effort would have not only weakened the earthly concern support for the war but would also bring the forces of the American allies back to Europe to contest the blockades. In addition, the British naval forces would also gain ground from the much shorter supply chain in the event that their naval assets infallible repair. British leadership once again failed to see the strategic association between sea power and the unified strategic vision (Carpenter, NWC Lecture).Identifying Centers of sombernessA center of gravitational attraction is always found where the mass is gruelling most densely (On War, p.485). Correctly identifying the center of gravity or the hub of all power and movement, for which everything depends is ultimately the most critical part of defeating the enemy (On War, p. 596). blemish identification can prove to be costly in basis of resources, time and effectiveness on the battlefield. The British strategy during 1777-78 was to isolate colonies and systematically destroy the enemy. In order to execute, the strategy involved identifying and targeting large conglomerates of rebels, in other words attacking American cities. The British perception was by capturing cities like natural York and Philadelphia the rebel forces would view this overtaking and inevitably force submission to the colonialist.The mistake in the British perception was identifying American cities as t he centers of gravity. They failed to understand that the center of gravity was the Continental Army and the overwhelming public support for independence. This misunderstanding was demonstrated by British General Howe when he attempted to seize Philadelphia in order to lure General working capital to fight.The problem was that he attempted this operation independently, diverging from the planned strategy of cutting off and controlling the waterways coming in from Canada. Howe failed to understand that the center of gravity for the American colonists did not lie within a urban center but more in popular support for independence. In addition, by not supporting the established planned, his actions ultimately contributed to the defeat in the engagement of Saratoga. This example not only exhibits how the British misunderstood the center of gravity but also shows the command and control issues the British had as well. omit of Diplomatic ProcessArguably the most significant factor in Br itains demise was the failure to negotiate diplomatically from the onset of the conflict and routinely throughout. As the French and Indian War winded down, the British Empire was grand, very pompous and displayed signs of arrogance. This overconfidence contributed to why they didnt show concern in addressing the needs of the American colonists more diplomatically. This allowed the colonist to toss their focus to complete independence and strengthen their resolve for a typical democracy. Had they better understood the American objections and drive, they could have taken a more proactive approach to amicably reach a consensus and the war whitethorn have been prevented.The Americans, on the other, knew the importance of diplomatic traffichips. This was demonstrated with the alliances they built with France, Spain and the Netherlands. These relationships proved to be a vital piece of their strategy. The British Army had several advantages over the colonial forces size, training, exp erience, financial support, etc. Through the international relations that were forged, America reaped many benefits of financial support, ammunitions, manpower and most importantly naval support. These relationships proved to be a decisive factor in the American victory.ConclusionOverall the British demise during the American Revolution can be attributed to several key areas lack of a unified strategy, contain to no command and control, lack of synchronization among troops, government organizational structure, premature and unresponsive decision making and ineffective supply chain management. In addition, the adopted naval strategy failed to establish an effective naval strategy to overpower French and Spanish forces thereby increasing difficulties on the battlefield. By not clearly understanding the nature war and never truly defining an overarching objective, British leadership repeatedly encountered logistic and tactical challenges were proved to be fatal for their success.Bib liographyCarpenter, NWC lecture Red Team Britain and the American War for Independence Clausewitz, C. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton Princeton University Press, 1989. Mahan, A. T. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. New York Dover, 1987. The Recruiting of the Army. The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution, Chapter 3. http//americanrevolution.org/britisharmy3.html.